A border city: refers to a town that stands between the territory of Israel and that of other nations. We must defend it, lest enemies capture it and thereby gain easy acesss to conquer the rest of the land.
RASHI, EIRUVIN 45a
I reiterate: Every military expert I know of who was asked answered, without exception, that any territorial concession in Judea, Samaria, and the Golan, literally amounts to putting lives in danger, without any doubt in the matter.
THE REBBE1
Land’s Strategic Value
When it comes to a border city, the rules are more stringent. Even if the enemies are coming for insignificant items, such as straw or hay, we are obligated to desecrate Shabbos to fend them off.
Section 329 of the Code of Jewish Law emphasizes the importance of territorial integrity, stating that we must defend the border so that “the land not be opened up for easy conquest.”2 This demonstrates not only that Land for Peace is a bad policy, but also that it violates Jewish Law.3 As the Rebbe expressed the point:4
I am completely and unequivocally opposed to the surrender of any of the liberated areas currently under negotiation, such as Judea and Samaria, the Golan, etc. The simple reason [for my opposition], and the only reason, is that surrendering any part of them would contravene a clear psak din [halachic ruling] in Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim, sec. 329, par. 6,7). I have repeatedly emphasized that this psak din has nothing to do with the sanctity of Eretz Yisrael, or with the days of Mashiach or the Geulah [Redemption], and similar considerations, but solely with the rule of pikuach nefesh [saving lives].
Israel’s Precarious Geography
The Rebbe explained that topographical realities render the entire Land of Israel a “border town,”5 necessitating constant vigilance and readiness to act against threats.6 This thus forbids territorial concessions as they would endanger the Jewish people living in Israel. This ruling applies to all of modern day Israel, with a particular emphasis on Judea and Samaria, which are of paramount importance for national security.7
Israel is intrinsically in a state of siege, surrounded by hostile groups. Unlike the adversaries described in the Talmud and Code of Jewish Law, who only sought literal or proverbial “straw” and “grain,” Israel’s contemporary enemies explicitly express their intentions to seize the land and banish or annihilate its Jewish inhabitants.8 Consequently, Jews who can take up arms must do so, even without the directives of a beis din (Jewish Court of Law), a king, or local Jewish government.9 The Rebbe taught:10
We must revisit the Talmud’s teachings regarding Neharde’a, [a city outside the Land of Israel that was]11 home to a diverse Jewish population. [Despite the city’s location and demographic composition,] the Talmud establishes a single criterion: Will the Land be easily conquerable? If the answer is affirmative, the Talmud determines that this places Jewish lives at risk. [In such a scenario,] there is an immediate imperative to take [decisive] action without [delay or the need to] seek outside opinions.12
Clearly, in order to save Jewish lives, we must not give away territory to our enemies in exchange for elusive promises of peace. Instead, we must defend strategically valuable territory. This demonstrates that the primary importance of holding land is not the Land’s holy status, but Jewish security.
Let’s consider several case studies which demonstrate that territorial integrity is critical in order to provide security.
Case Studies
A) The Gaza Withdrawal
As we saw previously, the Gaza withdrawal turned the region into a terror base from which to launch much deadlier attacks on Israel than before the disengagement. The events of October 7, 2023, leave no doubt that this is the case.
B) Maintaining the Golan Heights
In 1967, Israel reclaimed the Golan Heights from Syria.13 Although the “international community” and Syria have repeatedly demanded it back,14 Israel refuses to return it. The Golan Heights plays a significant role in Israel’s defense strategy for several reasons:
1. Strategic Location
The Golan Heights is situated on a plateau overlooking Northern Israel. Before Israel recaptured the Golan Heights in 1967, the area was used by Syrian forces and associated terrorist groups as a base for repeated attacks on Israeli communities in the Hula Valley and around the Sea of Galilee. Controlling the Golan Heights has eliminated these security threats.
2. Early Warning System
The Golan Heights’ elevation allows for early detection of incoming attacks from Syria, such as artillery or aerial threats, or even ground invasions, providing Israel with additional crucial response time.
3. Terrain
The Golan Heights’ rugged terrain acts as a natural barrier, making any ground assault from Syria, similar to the one they launched in the Six-Day War, more challenging.
4. Water
The Golan Heights is a key source of water for the region. Controlling this area ensures Israeli access to these vital water resources and prevents Syria from threatening Israel’s primary water supply, the Kinneret.
Thus, despite international pressure, the Code of Jewish Law indicates that Israel must retain full control over the Golan Heights to ensure its security.15
Of course, if Israel ceded the Golan Heights, this would seriously jeopardize its security. The Golan Heights’ perennial strategic significance became highlighted even more sharply since the Syrian Civil War began in 2011. The war destabilized the entire region, and moreover has had ripple effects across the world, by dispersing millions of refugees.
Jihadist groups hostile to Israel flourish in Syria, while Iran cemented itself in the region as an ally of the Syrian regime.16 If the Golan Heights was important for Israel’s security in the past, the rise of these more volatile enemies just beyond it makes retaining the region even more crucial.17
At the time of this writing, Bashar al-Assad’s hostile regime has fallen. Israel made the responsible move of taking Mount Hermon, the highest peak in the region, along with parts of the Quneitra18 district.19 This move comes fifty years late. Already in 1974, the Rebbe observed:20
Regarding the current situation in the Holy Land, the main point of contention and controversy concerns control over Mount Hermon, which is the ‘key’ for maintaining security and control over the entire border region.
It is clear that Mount Hermon (and Quneitra) belongs to the people of Israel, as explicitly stated in Joshua regarding ‘the Lebanon Valley under Mount Hermon.’21 However, after that there was an interruption when it was not under Jewish control, due to the matter of exile - ‘because we were exiled from our land’ (and when we were exiled from there, this mountain remained ‘our land’). And now – it has returned to Jewish control.
Israel has asserted control of this vital territory in the wake of the Assad regime’s miraculous dissolution. It must now maintain this territory, which is both vital for its security and a critical part of the biblical Jewish heartland.22
C) Maintaining Judea and Samaria
Judea and Samaria, which Israel reclaimed during the Six-Day War, are crucial for Israel’s security. Consider the following:
1. Strategic Depth
Judea and Samaria provide Israel with strategic depth, which is particularly important given the narrow width of Israel’s pre-1967 borders.23 This means that Israel now has expanded borders, population centers, and military installations which strengthen its position, making it less vulnerable to attacks to begin with and better able to fend off attacks if they do occur.24
2. High Ground
The elevated terrain of Judea and Samaria overlooks key Israeli population centers and infrastructure. Control over these areas provides a defensive advantage, and also prevents terrorists from using this ground to attack Israel.
3. Buffer Zone
Judea and Samaria act as a buffer between Israel and threats from the east, most proximally Jordan. Although Israel now has a peace treaty with Jordan, these areas still serve as a strategic buffer due to Jordan’s lax control, which has allowed a significant influx of weapons into Judea and Samaria.25 This impacts Israelis living in these regions by allowing for more frequent and deadlier terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, given that Israel has general military control over the region, hostile forces are unable to orchestrate major attacks without Israeli interference.
Control over the Jordan valley is even more important given that much of Jordan’s populace is virulently anti-Israel, a fact highlighted by the large-scale anti-Israel riots that have been held there since October 7, 2023.26 Although Jordan is ruled by an authoritarian monarchy at the time of this writing, if the regime were overthrown Israel could face severe threats from Jordan.27 The most likely outcomes are that Jordan would be taken over by a hostile government, or that there would be a power vacuum where Jordan fragments into control by factions and militias, many of whom are hostile.
4. Control of Vital Resources
Judea and Samaria provide control over and access to the region’s ample water resources.
However, perhaps if we just gave the Palestinians what they wanted, then none of these factors would matter. The problem with this argument is that Israel successively granted greater autonomy to Palestinians since the Oslo Accords in 1993. This autonomy correlated with a large increase in both the frequency and force of terror attacks. The Rebbe had foretold this in years of talks, urgently predicting that granting autonomy would only lead to increased attacks.28
In 2006, when Hamas won the Palestinian elections and took control over Gaza, they declared all previous peace agreements, including the Oslo Accords, void.29 This demonstrates the instability and volatility of the Land for Peace strategy. Consider the following presentation and graphics which illustrate Israel’s vulnerability to attack without control over Judea and Samaria:30
D) The Sinai Withdrawal
Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula on two occasions. The first was during the 1956 Suez Crisis. However, due to international pressure, Israel withdrew in 1957. Israel again took the Sinai in the 1967 Six-Day War. However, following the Camp David Accords in 1978, Israel conceded the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.
The Rebbe strongly objected to Israel’s decision to relinquish the Sinai Peninsula, arguing that doing so compromised Israel’s security, putting Jewish lives at risk.31 He presented several arguments to support his position, all of which have stood the test of time:32
1. Power Ensures Peace
Land offers strategic power, making a country less susceptible to attacks – thereby engendering a state of peace. Following a ceasefire with Israel that marked the end of the War of Attrition in 1970, Sadat’s predecessor, Nasser, moved Egyptian forces to what was then the border with Israel, ultimately culminating in the deadly Yom Kippur War.33 Sadat could have acted similarly, using his later treaty as a Trojan horse to compromise Israel’s security. Therefore, the peace treaty was a grave strategic error. Moreover, Sadat flagrantly violated the terms of the treaty soon after they were signed by placing soldiers in Sinai’s demilitarized zones.34
If Egypt ever chooses to attack Israel, it is now in a much stronger position than it would have been without having control over the Sinai, which comes with access to multiple airfields, oil fields, and additional strategic territory.35
2. Peace as a Ploy
The Rebbe explained the Camp David Accords as a cynical Egyptian ploy, leveraging the Jewish desire for peace and U.S. geopolitical interests to receive concessions from Israel through “peace” instead of war.36 By the time Sadat offered “peace”, Egypt had lost four wars37 against Israel; Israel had captured the Sinai Peninsula twice and fended off an Egyptian invasion. Given these circumstances, Egypt could not credibly hope to win a war against Israel. Therefore, Sadat chose to take through “peace” what he could not have through war.38
Numerous factors cast doubt on Sadat’s sincerity in his commitment to the peace treaty.
First, in 1975, Sadat changed Egypt’s Armed Forces Day to October 6, commemorating the day Egypt attacked Israel in 1973, setting off the Yom Kippur War. Sadat maintained this designation during and after the negotiation and ratification of the Camp David Accords, and it continues to be marked in Egypt to this day.39
More strikingly, just seven months after signing the treaty with Israel, Sadat issued a presidential decree founding “the 6th of October City.” This city commemorates the Egyptian attack against Israel at the Yom Kippur War’s outset. It is a curious choice to commemorate an attack on a nation with which one has recently made peace.
Even if Sadat himself was sincere – and the previous evidence implies he was not – the Egyptian public certainly did not embrace Israel.40 While Israelis flocked to visit Egypt following the ratification of the treaty, Egyptians continued to show disdain towards Israel. As the Rebbe noted:41
The only “achievement” secured in the “peace treaty” was allowing Jews to visit Egypt and look at beautiful buildings and the ancient ruins. In other words, [the agreement merely facilitated a superficial] exchange of tourists between the two nations. However, upon examining the tourism statistics, it becomes evident that very few Egyptians visit Israel. In contrast, if not for the difficulties of securing an entry visa, hundreds of thousands of Israelis would flock to visit Alexandria and other Egyptian cities, spending tens of thousands of shekels in the process.
3. Regional Instability
Peace treaties in the Middle East are very fragile affairs. First, the totalitarian leaders of those nations can change their minds at any moment, rendering any treaty unstable. Second, Middle Eastern and North African nations are prone to sudden changes in leadership that lead to the rise of radical governments, as was the case in Iran.42 This fear materialized in the case of Egypt when, shortly after the peace treaty’s signing, an assassin killed Sadat.
Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, had a lengthy tenure (from 1981 to 2011). Egypt did not pose a live security threat to Israel during this period as Mubarak did not instigate any attacks. Yet, Mubarak’s authoritarian rule only lasted as long as the political conditions allowed. In 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama traveled to Cairo where he addressed the Islamic world promising a new beginning. A new beginning indeed came.The following year, in 2010, the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, the first in a series of populist uprisings that rocked the Middle East and North Africa. In 2011, the protests came to Egypt, leading to Mubarak’s swift deposition. In a popular election, Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, the organization from which Hamas emerged, came to power.
4. Dangerous Concessions for a “Piece of Paper”
Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula involved the loss of both strategic and economic assets. All it received in return was a “piece of paper,”43 a cold truce which can be violated at any time. Let’s explore the key assets Israel relinquished:
Oil Fields: One of the most significant losses for Israel was the oil fields in the Sinai. Israel had discovered and developed the Alma oil field as well as others in the region which supplied a substantial portion of its oil needs.44 Ceding these fields to Egypt meant that Israel had to find alternative, more expensive sources of oil, which seriously damaged the Israeli economy.45 Furthermore, this loss made Israel far more vulnerable to international pressure, since Israel could be forced into security compromises under threat of oil being withheld.46 Ceding control of the oil fields also exposed the Egyptian peace treaty as a ploy. To this day, Egypt celebrates the anniversary of reclaiming the oil fields from Israel.47 What it could not take by war, it took by “peace.” The Rebbe repeatedly bemoaned this mistake, noting:48
In this day and age, oil is an indispensable vital weapon, for without it, planes and tanks are put out of action as surely as if they had been knocked out.49 Sure enough, before long, the government found it necessary to demand urgent oil deliveries from the United States, since the reserve would last only a few days. Moreover, prominent members of the government publicly admitted that it was a serious mistake to have surrendered the oil wells. Be it also noted that since the surrender of the oil wells in Sinai — according to the Government’s figures — some 2-1/2 billion dollars was paid by it to Egypt for oil from the very same wells that had been surrendered. Not to mention the fact of having to buy oil elsewhere also, at exorbitant prices.50
Military Bases and Infrastructure: Israel had invested heavily in military installations, including air force bases51 and other strategic infrastructure in the Sinai Peninsula. When withdrawing from the region, they either dismantled or abandoned these facilities, resulting in substantial financial losses and security vulnerabilities.52 Moreover, Israel relinquished air force bases that were crucial to the success of high-profile operations such as the Entebbe hostage rescue mission53 and the preemptive strike on Iraq’s nuclear reactor.
Tourism and Real Estate: The Sinai Coast, especially areas like Sharm El-Sheikh, had been developing into a tourist destination under Israeli control. Israel’s withdrawal meant a loss of investments in substantial tourist-related infrastructure and revenue.54
Relocation and Compensation Costs: Israel incurred substantial costs in forcibly removing Jewish civilian residents and relocating military personnel from the Sinai. This included the costs of building new homes, communities, and infrastructure in other parts of Israel. The government also had to compensate Sinai’s Jewish residents for their lost homes and livelihoods. Furthermore, removing Sinai’s Jewish residents ethically breached promises the Israeli government had made to encourage settlement in the region.55 The expulsion also exploited the young Israeli soldiers who had joined the army. They joined with the intention of risking their lives to protect the Jewish people – and were instead commanded to evict fellow Jews from their homes.56
5. Setting a Dangerous Precedent
The Camp David Accords and Sinai withdrawal marked both the first time Israel ceded “Land for Peace” and the first time Israel forcibly evicted its citizens from territory that it evacuated for “peace” with its erstwhile enemies. This set a dangerous precedent for the future concerning areas of vital strategic and ancestral significance such as Judea, Samaria, Gaza, and Jerusalem.57
The Sinai withdrawal thus substantially cost Israel strategically, economically, and morally.58
In an English letter addressed to a member of the B’nai B’rith Messenger59 staff, the Rebbe distilled his views on the Camp David Accords:60
Sadder still, there appeared some Jewish leaders who, for the sake of peace, or rather the illusion of peace – and frightened by threats of further violence in the midst of a hostile and callous world – were prepared to and actually did surrender portions of our land, in the ill-conceived belief that our enemies would thereby be appeased. Moreover, contrary to all experience and common sense, which have demonstrated again and again that every act of appeasement and concession only invites stronger pressures to yield to even more avaricious demands, there are still those among our own people who persist in following this dismal course. The so-called Camp David Accords are only the culmination of the first phase of this ill-fated and self-defeating policy.
As you may have heard, when the Camp David negotiations were initiated, I considered it my sacred duty to call attention to the true nature of this disastrous expediency. There was no basis in law, nor in justice, nor in reality, to give in to pressure to sign an accord and treaty by which one party gives all and the other party takes all; namely, first giving away tangible and vital resources in terms of territory, fortifications, air fields, oil wells, and the dismantling of settlements, etc., all vital to its security, while the other gives in return no more than promises, such as the establishment of communications, exchange of ambassadors, and “normalization” of relations, all of which could be revoked at any moment under one pretext or another. I warned that far from bringing real and lasting peace, this “accord” would only whet our enemies’ appetite for more “grabs,” encouraged by the weakened security position of their adversary. I also warned that it was folly to put one’s trust in the USA’s part of this agreement, for it was obvious that the USA was leaning heavily towards the Arab position.
Since the signing of the Camp David Accords and Treaty, the consequences it has spawned have turned out to be even worse than I feared. Now, some 18 months later, everyone can clearly see that Egypt never intended to keep its promises fully. Right from the moment it took over one segment of Sinai after another, it broke its pledge to keep these zones demilitarized, though for the sake of expediency this matter has been hushed up. Even at this moment, Egypt is busily engaged in aggressive military preparations (the construction of tunnels under the Suez is but one glaring example). This should come as no surprise, given the record of broken Egyptian pledges in the period following the Yom Kippur War, and ever since 1948. At the same time, it is demanding, and obtaining, from the U.S. an ever-increasing supply of the most sophisticated weaponry, not to mention what is going to such other “moderate” Arab states as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even Iraq.
Such is the “even-handed” policy of our U.S. Government. Be it also noted that even in regard to its own obligations in connection with the Camp David Accords, particularly the assurance of oil supplies to compensate for the surrender of the oil wells in Sinai — developed with Jewish ingenuity and resources — it has found a convenient loophole, claiming that the situation is not “critical” as stipulated, which obliges the country to spend millions of dollars in overcharges on the open market, thus putting a critical squeeze on the economy of Eretz Yisrael, which is in dire enough straits as it is.
While the Camp David Accords are hailed as a great symbol of peace, in fact, the accords were an Egyptian strategic and economic victory. Correspondingly, they weakened Israel strategically and economically. The Six-Day War’s territorial gains and their successful defense in the Yom Kippur War could have allowed Israel to become a regional superpower. Israel squandered this opportunity through the Sinai concessions, accepting a fragile peace that allowed Egypt to strengthen itself for potential future attacks.
Strategic and Sacred: A Multilayered Argument Against “Land for Peace”
The Rebbe’s key argument against Land for Peace centers around pragmatic security considerations not at all tied to Israel’s intrinsic holiness. That said, the Rebbe also emphasized that G‑d miraculously returned the entire Land of Israel, and particularly Judea and Samaria, to the Jewish people. Therefore, giving up this Land would demonstrate profound ingratitude towards G‑d on Israel’s part.61
The Rebbe had multiple layers of reasons as to why Israel should not give away land. He pithily summarized these in a brief note to Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovitz.62
I spoke of the prohibition to concede land based on the ruling of the Code of Jewish Law, irrespective of the Land’s sanctity.
I also spoke of the Land’s sanctity.
I also spoke of the [military] victory which occurred through open miracles63 [as a result of which giving away Land would demonstrate ingratitude to G‑d].
Each of these points responds to different questions and claims:
The first is the practical question of conceding the territory in Judea, Samaria, and the Golan. My response was based on the well-known hostility of Jordan and Syria, [given which, conceding the Land would be dangerous.] Moreover, since all of this territory is on the border, relinquishing it would violate a clear ruling in the Code of Jewish Law with respect to pikuach nefesh (saving lives), [a ruling] which applies even in a case of a remote possibility of danger to life. And in the Talmud’s terms, [it holds] even in Babylon.
The next question was with respect to the unfortunate Camp David Treaty, where some claimed that in order to be honorable we need to uphold it. To this, I responded that a treaty can only be signed on that which belongs to a person; but one cannot relinquish what does not belong to them, for the Land of Israel is an eternal inheritance for the eternal nation. And, similarly, there are other answers for different questions. But as stated, with respect to the practical question, the most grave and serious concern relates to pikuach nefesh, and therefore I asked many times not to blur the issue with other concerns.
Summary
Land for Peace is a well-meaning but naive slogan. In this class, we have explored the Rebbe’s strategic objections to relinquishing land, which he explains is essential to Jewish defense. Given land’s strategic value, it is non-negotiable.
We have seen that the Rebbe’s objection to Land for Peace is not merely academic. Instead, studying the topography of Judea, Samaria, and the Golan Heights demonstrates their critical importance for Israel’s security. We have further seen that every case where Israel has relinquished land has led to serious loss of life and security. Finally, we have seen how the Gaza withdrawal and the Sinai withdrawal set the stage for the cataclysmic deluge unleashed by the carnage of October 7. By contrast, holding Judea, Samaria and the Golan gave, and continue to give Israel security.
Having delved into risk assessment, risk tolerance, and the strategic value of land, let us now return to the final clause in section 329:6 of the Code of Jewish Law:
And even if the attackers have not yet arrived but merely intend to come, Jewish defenders must preemptively take up arms [and neutralize the threat].
This clause offers us a further articulation of the principle of proactive defense which we encountered earlier. Yet, sometimes, even proactive defense is insufficient to address an entrenched enemy. What is the Torah’s perspective on prosecuting a war against an implacable foe? We will explore this question in the next class.
Exercises:
- Comment below: How do you think historians 100 years from now will view the territorial decisions being made today?
- Comment below: If you've experienced rocket attacks, terror, or military service, how does that visceral experience shape your views differently than abstract analysis? If you haven't, how do you account for that gap in understanding?
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